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Cocoa production contributes largely to Ghana’s export earnings. Cocoa farmers in 
Ghana face both price risks and production risks. Ghana’s cocoa sector faces negligible 
price risk because the government pays a fixed producer price.  However the cocoa 
sector is faced with different forms of production risks due to pest and disease, climate 
change, variations in weather patterns and  outbreak of bush fires among others. Cocoa 
farmers in the Atiwa District, known to be one of the major cocoa producing districts 
in Ghana face these uncertain production risks that cause crop failures leading to low 
production yields. Therefore, one strategy to mitigate such risks is to insure their cocoa 
farms against uncertain risks to hedge against crop loss. Insurance helps to measure 
risk and protect farmers against crop failures. This study evaluated the major 
production risks faced by cocoa farmers in Ghana,  the extent of the awareness of cocoa 
farmers in general insurance products, identified the factors that influence the 
willingness of cocoa farmers to insure their farms and  identify the average price cocoa 
farmers are willing to pay to insure their farms. A random sampling approach was used 
to sample 133 cocoa farmers in the Upper West Akim District in the Eastern Region of 
Ghana. A  Contingent Valuation Model is used to infer the utility maximization levels 
and design an appropriate questionnaire to measure the willingness of farmers to adopt 
crop insurance. Using a probit and logistic model, age and other income sources of 
cocoa farmers were found to influence the willingness of farmers to adopt crop 
insurance.  
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CVM- Contingent Valuation Model 
GAIS - Ghana Agricultural Insurance Program 
LBC – Licensed Buying Company  
PPRC – Production Price Review Committtee  
WTP- Willingness to Pay 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Introduction, Background and Problem Statement  
The contribution of agriculture to developing countries in the world cannot be 
overemphasized. African countries continue to pursue a competitive edge to promote 
growth in their economies. To be able to achieve this comparative advantage, developing 
economies tend to make efforts to increase foreign exchange to promote economic 
growth through commodity exports (World Bank, 2003). Many developing economies 
such as Ghana depend hugely on earnings from the export of major agricultural products 
such as cocoa.   
Countries that produce cocoa get sizable proportions of their export earnings from 
cocoa (FAO, 2004). Over the past 19 years, the African continent, notably West African 
countries, have done well to be the leading producers of cocoa in the world. Africa was 
estimated to have produced about 3.2 million tons of cocoa beans for the 2013/2014 crop 
year (Ameyaw et al., 2018). This contributed to 73% of the world’s cocoa production, 
with Cote D’Ivoire and Ghana, the two principal cocoa-producing countries (Ameyaw et 
al., 2018). Awuah (2002) and FAO (2004) estimated that West African countries 
contribute between 54% and 71% of the world’s total cocoa output. For example, Cote 
d’Ivoire exported a record of 1.4 million tons of cocoa beans in 2001. This milestone 
added to 14% of the country’s GDP, 40% of export, and about 20% of government 
revenue (Nkamleu & Kielland, 2006).   
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Cocoa is successfully cultivated in the Western, Eastern, Brong -Ahafo, Volta, 
Central, and the Ashanti regions of Ghana (Anim-Kwapong & Frimpong, 2004). Ghana 
is ordered as the second highest producer of cocoa in the world, only behind Cote 
D’Ivoire, producing almost a fifth of the world’s total output of cocoa (Vigneri & 
Santos, 2007). Ghana produced a record high of 1,004,000 metric tons in the 2010 and 
2011 crop years (COCOBOD, 2011). Ghana is also regarded on the international market 
for producing the world’s quality cocoa beans (Armah, 2008). 
The cocoa sector in Ghana has been contributing immensely to its export earnings 
over the past decade (Tutu, 2011). The cocoa sector generates employment, food, foreign 
exchange earnings, income, and tax revenue for the Ghanaian economy. For example, out 
of the 38% foreign exchange earnings contributed by the agriculture sector, the cocoa 
sector contributed about 28.5 percent in 2008 (ISSER, 2008). The Ghana cocoa sector 
contributes mostly, if not only, sources of revenue, livelihood, and incomes for farmers 
(Tutu, 2011). The Ghana cocoa sector creates a lot of employmet for Ghanaians as it 
employs an estimated 3,200,000 people along its commodity chain, and about 800,000 
smallholders (farmers owning less than 12 acres of cocoa land) farmers nationwide 
(Lundstedt & Pärssinen, 2009).   
  Anim-Kwapong and Frimpong (2004) provided a synopsis of the impact of cocoa 
producing by asserting that about 800,000 smallholder cocoa farmers in Ghana earn a lot 
of their annual earnings primarily from cocoa production. The Ghana cocoa sector 
generates domestic income and accounts for about 25 percent of foreign exchange 
earnings (ISSER, 2014). Reports approximate that in 2013, 16.48% (US$ 2267.3 million) 
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of all the agriculture export receipts were foreign revenue earnings from cocoa (ISSER, 
2014).   
Cocoa has contributed more than 30 percent of Ghana’s export earnings over the 
crop years 1995 to 2014 (ACET, 2014). Subsequently, other stakeholders such as the 
licensed cocoa buying companies, agrochemical suppliers,  input and output distributors 
get their products, income and employment from the cocoa industry (Asamoah & Baah, 
2003).   
Ghana is not only known for producing high quantities of cocoa, but it is the most 
central origin of high-quality cocoa beans with the country’s cocoa considered as the 
standard for measuring the quality of bulk cocoa on the international market 
(International Trade Center, 2001; Ntiamoah & Afrane,2008; Armah, 2009; Gockowski 
et al.; 2011).  
The Ghanaian cocoa sector has seen significant progress in recent years although 
dependence on a small number of export commodities has often created susceptible 
international price volatilities (UNCTAD, 2005; Wilson, 1985). Nevertheless, with world 
prices of agricultural export goods increasing, and coupled with rapid global economic 
growth indicates how the demand-driven prices might continue (IMF, 2018; World Bank, 
2007).  
Ghana is a leading example, where internal reforms and favorable external 
conditions have brought about an increase in traditional exports with Ghana regaining its 
top place among the world’s largest producers of cocoa (Mackay and Aryteey, 2005). It 
is, therefore, not coincidental that the Ghana’s cocoa sector continues to perform well 
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after a poor output performance between 1970-1990 (Armah, 2009; Ghana Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2005).   
The contributions the cocoa market has made to the Ghanaian economy has been 
outstanding and immense. That notwithstanding, the Ghana cocoa sector has been 
witnessing fluctuations in production over the last decades. Two major risks affect cocoa 
farmers (Freshwater & Jette-Nantel, 2008). The risks are production and price risks. Price 
risk is concerned about the disparities in the market prices of cocoa seeds and production 
inputs. The Government of Ghana in conjunction with the Producer Price Review 
Committee (PPRC) and COCOBOD set a fixed producer price every year for cocoa 
farmers in Ghana (Lundstedt & Pärssinen, 2009). The objective is to reduce the negative 
impact of cocoa price fluctuations on farmers (Lundstedt & Pärssinen, 2009). The 
producer price is a price floor. The price restrains LBCs to buy cocoa farmers below the 
producer price. Considering the world market price for cocoa fluctuates, the government, 
PPRC, and COCOBOD (Cocoa Marketing Board) have set a difference between the 
actual price and the predicted price (Lundstedt & Pärssinen, 2009). The latter is the price 
on which the producer price is set. This means that the price fluctuation could create 
either a surplus or a deficit. The Government of Ghana and the cocoa farmers share the 
surplus, with farmers receiving the surplus in the form of bonuses at the end of the 
purchasing season. The Government of Ghana, however, covers all the deficits, if any, 
alone. In contrast to Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, the leading exporter of cocoa in the world has 
a liberalized market, where the price stabilization duties of their cocoa marketing board 
have been eliminated (Lundstedt & Pärssinen, 2009). Since producer prices are not fixed, 
fluctuation in international cocoa prices will lead to a decline in cocoa revenue for 
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farmers. This does not incentivize cocoa farmers to produce quality cocoa beans 
(Lundstedt & Pärssinen, 2009). In contrast, Ghana has a reputation for its high-quality 
cocoa beans, which allows COCOBOD to pre-finance its farmers by trading in the futures 
market (Armah, 2008; Sibun, 2008). This paper does not focus on the price risk faced by 
cocoa farmers because the Government of Ghana controls the price that farmers receive 
but focuses on production risk. 
Production risks are the risks that affect the variations in the quality and quantity 
of cocoa production (Okuffo et al., 2016). The industry faces several production risks 
such as bush fire, low crop yield, pest and disease outbreak, whims of nature (climate 
change), and natural hazards like droughts and flooding (Vilalobos, 1989). Yearly cocoa 
production declines are a result of the uncertain risks farmers face, and since they are 
beyond the farmers’ control, farming has become a risky occupation. Between the 1998 
and 2005 cocoa season, growth in production fluctuated from 350,000 tons to about 
750,000 tons. However, there has been a growth in production in the last decade with a 
record-high 1,000,000 tons produced in the 2012 cocoa season (Okuffo et al., 2016). 
There is a popular conviction that the increase in production yield is because of several 
interventions such as the “Cocoa Mass Spraying Exercise” (Okoffo et al., 2016). 
Although there has been an impressive growth in production, Ghana’s per hectare yield is 
400kg per hectare of land which smaller when  likened to Cote d’Ivoire’s  800kg per 
hectare of land and Malaysia 1800kg per hectare of land (Lundstedt & Pärssinen, 2009). 
The Ghana cocoa sector’s average yield per hectare of land is shy of the expected average 
of about 1000kg per a hectare of land (Danso-Abbeam et al., 2014).   
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Johny et al. (2003) assert that pests and diseases affect cocoa production yields 
negatively in developing countries. It is reported that about 30-40% of cocoa produced 
globally is being affected and lost through pests and diseases (ICCO, 2015). The most 
prevalent harmful disease is black pod. Nkamleu et al. (2007) estimated that the black 
pod disease contributes to an annual loss of about 44% of all global cocoa production. 
Another damaging virus is the cocoa swollen shoot virus (CSSV) that triggers swelling of 
the roots and stems of the cocoa tree (Danso-Abbeam et al., 2014).   
Similarly, damaging to cocoa production are insect pests, cocoa capsids, or mirids 
that cause substantial reductions in cocoa production. Nkamleu et al. estimated that an 
outbreak of these pests could cause about a 75% production loss mostly in places where 
cocoa trees have been abandoned. Mistletoes are also parasites that affect newly cocoa 
plantations after a forest has been cleared to cultivate the cocoa plant.   
Due to climate change, weather patterns have as well been inconsistent. The 
variations in rainfall patterns are reflected by the increasing flooding cases and severe 
drought periods which has subsequently reduced cocoa yields (IPCC, 2014; Laux et al., 
2010). Smallholder farmers depend heavily on rainfall as a source of moistness. This 
means farmers are likely to make production losses when rainfall patterns become 
inconsistent, making farmers lose significant portions of their investment and income 
(Laux et al., 2010). The uncertain risks associated with cocoa production grow 
pessimisms across farming communities as farmers lose their investments and income 
which leaves them stuck in the vicious cycle of poverty in developing countries 
(Ajakaiye, 2001). This cycle is mirrored by low output levels which leads to low income 
earnings, leaving farmers with less or no money to invest in the farms (Ajakaiye, 2001). 
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For years, some cocoa farmers have sought to cultivate other crops, use of pesticides, and 
fertilizer applications to hedge production risks and increase yield (Ajakaiye, 2001).   
To lessen the challenges of low productivity growths, the government of Ghana 
has implemented several initiatives through the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOABOD), 
Quality Control Division and the Cocoa Marketing Board to mitigate risks in the cocoa 
sector.  
COCOABOD and its divisions were established in 1947. It is the statutory public 
institution mandated to regulate the cocoa industry in Ghana (COCOABOD, 2019). Over 
the years, COCOABOD has implemented policies like Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus 
Disease Control Unit (CSSVDCU), Seed Production Unit (SPU), Cocoa Diseases and 
Pest Control Program(CODAPEC) popularly known as the Cocoa Mass Spraying all 
were aiming to mitigate risks that affect cocoa production (Danso-Abbeam et al., 2014). 
Through the Cocoa Mass Spraying program, inputs and labor to help control black 
pods and capsids are provided. COCOABOD has assumed a wide range of 
responsibilities that aims at monitoring, rehabilitation of old cocoa farms affected with 
pests and diseases, and spraying more than 3 million hectares for capsid and black pods 
(Choudhary & D’Alessandro, 2015). Fertilizers are also provided to farmers mostly on 
credit to boost production levels. Cocoa farmers are required per the regulations of 
COCOBOD to spray their cocoa farms four times in a cocoa season from August to 
December but leaving out November to harvest the cocoa fruits (ICCO, 2008; Adu-
Acheampong et al., 2007).   
Despite the positive impact that COCOABOD has played, several challenges still 
exist. Mass pilfering and sale of subsidized inputs for “mass spraying’ of cocoa farms, 
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subsidized fertilizers not reaching farmers, political interference in the “mass spraying” 
and “pollination” programs, the emergence of new cocoa diseases and pests, climate 
change and low adoption of technology among other challenges are existent (Quartey, 
2013).  
Considering the production risks in the Ghanaian cocoa market, crop insurance 
could be used as a risk management tool to enable cocoa farmers hedge against 
production losses.  
 Insurance is a policy that helps reduce the financial burden of uncertain events 
like loss of property, life, weather damages, accidents involving automobiles, and 
medical risks (Quagrainie, 2006). Similarly, Adams (1995) defined insurance as an 
agreement between parties or groups of parties where one party (insuree) pays a premium 
to the insurer so that the insurer pays a fixed amount of money to the insuree in the 
incidence of unexpected events.  
 Therefore, the adoption of crop insurance will protect farmers against completely 
losing all their investments or income should an event occur. With crop insurance, crop 
failures in a crop year will be moderated to provide a sense of production security for 
years (Ray, 2001). This would to make plans on how production risks could be 
effectively managed to help farmers hedge against losses now and in the future. Although 
important, several insurance schemes are provided by insurance schemes like health 
insurance, fire insurance, and auto insurance among others but none of the products of 
crop insurance to protect crop failures (Aidoo et al., 2014).   
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What factors influence the the willingness of cocoa farmers to adopt crop insurance?  
  
1.4 Research Objectives 
1. Evaluate the major production risks cocoa farmers in Ghana face.  
2. Evaluate the awareness levels of cocoa farmers on insurance policies and 
products.  
3. Identify the factors influencing the willingness of cocoa farmers to use crop 
insurance. 




The stakeholders of the study include are but not limited to cocoa farmers, 
insurance firms, the Government of Ghana, COCOBOD and policymakers that will be 
interested in how the insurance policies will benefit or cost cocoa farmers.   
 
1.6 Relevance of the study 
This study would provide information on the major production risks cocoa 
farmers face in Ghana. Considering that a crop insurance policy is advocated to help 
them mitigate the production risks that affect their crop yield, which will subsequently 
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increase their capital savings to both reduce the poverty cycle. The findings from this 
study could be used a guide for insurance companies when they consider selling crop 
insurance products. The government and other private cocoa purchasing firms will gain 
an increase in the production of cocoa production when production risks are minimized 
substantially.   
 
1.7 Structure of the study 
This study has five chapters. The first chapter, which is the introduction, consists 
of the background, description of the research problem, objectives, significance, and how 
the research is organized. The second chapter, the literature review, reviews existing 
literature on crop crop insurance, and theoretical and analytical framework. The third 
chapter of the study, methodology, describes the study area, how data was collected and 
how the data was analysed. The fourth chapter, the results, explains the findings of the 
study. The last section, conclusions and recommendations presents a summary of the 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW   
2.1 Crop Insurance 
Consistent with economic development theories such as Rostow’s stages of 
Growth.The model proposed by Walt Rostow in 1960 and Lewis’ Structural Change 
Models proposed by Arthur Lewis in 1954, the process of economic development starts 
with a focus on agriculture and then branches into other sectors of the economy such as 
manufacturing and service production as development advances. It is, hardly surprising 
that a large proportion of the population in developing countries relies on agriculture, 
often subsistence agriculture as their primary source of household income. According to 
Rostow, development economies go through five growth paths: traditional society, 
transitional stage, take-off stage, drive to maturity, and the stage of high mass 
consumption (Li & Hung, 2013).  
  The first stage is when agriculture is the primary industry with the majority of the 
population engaged in agricultural production, and the government having higher 
political power. in the first stage, factors such as climate change has a substantial effect 
on economic growth. Agriculture production develops, another business surface, and 
investment and savings in the economy increase because trade activities increase in the 
second stage. In the third stage, a lot of opportunities emerge for entrepreneurs to make 
use of technology to improve the economy, capitalism is encouraged, and gross national 
income subsequently increase. In the fourth stage, although innovative technology moves 
to other sectors of the economy, savings and investments generally decrease. In the final 
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stage, as industrialization reaches its peak, the income of the working population rises. 
They, therefore, demand many consumer goods (Anthony et al., 2009).   
Lewis’ model proposes that labor in dual economies is available to the urban 
industrialized sector at a constant wage determined by the existence of subsistence 
farming systems due to disguised unemployment in agriculture”. Lewis argues that it is 
only an increasing wage rate that will be able to draw more labor out of agriculture.   
The majority of Ghana’s population, just like other developing countries depend heavily 
on income generated from agricultural practices as their solitary source of income (Etwire 
et at., 2013). Etwire et al. (2013) asserted and emphasized that a lot of the countries in the 
world experience volatilities in crop yield and agricultural practices due to unpredicted 
variations in weather conditions caused by across-the-board climate change. Etwire et al. 
(2013) also determined that the contribution of agriculture to the economy of Ghana has 
been negatively affected due to the variations in the weather. These variations potentially 
reduce agricultural income through, for example, crop losses, forcing farmers into 
poverty without proper risk management mechanisms. Barnett et al. (2008) emphasized 
that income losses cause farmers to manage their financial risks badly, making them earn 
low returns on their assets and forcing farmers to make an untimely sale of their assets. 
These effects can potentially affect the general performance of a country’s economic 
performance (Barnett et al., 2008).   
 In a lot of aspects, agricultural practices are subject to a sizeable amount of 
uncertainty (Ray, 1981). Ray (1981) underlines that agriculture is particularly susceptible 
to physical insecurities of nature since it requires continuous, widespread, and direct 
contact with the force of nature compared to other forms of business setups. Uncertainties 
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in businesses related to agriculture range from disease and pest related, and weather-
related hazards such as variations in rainfall leading to floods, windstorms, droughts 
among others. These uncertainties create pervasive risks to a lot of farmers in developing 
countries, especially those depending heavily on agricultural practices (Miranda & Farrin, 
2012).   
With a lot of the farming activities centered in rural communities in developing 
countries, farmers use numerous management approaches to reduce the occurrence of 
risks in their farm activities. Diversification of crops, cultivating resistant crops on 
farmlands where such crops are vulnerable, hedging, contracting farmers to work on 
producing specific crops, and crop insurance are some of the management approaches 
used by farmers to mitigate risks on their farms. Comparatively, the use of crop insurance 
is not a common practice in developing countries like the other approaches listed. Ramiro 
(2009) defined crop insurance as a system of a risk management approach that is used to 
protect against a conditional loss. In essence, insurance allows for an impartial shift of 
risk of loss from one entity to another in exchange for a premium or a promise of a 
guaranteed small loss to avert a possible huge overwhelming loss (Swiss, 2007). 
Crop insurance is a form of insurance policy that is used by agricultural firms, 
which enables farmers to hedge against production losses. Despite its various advantages, 
there are several challenges involved in covering crop losses. Crop insurance is different 
from other special lines of insurance such as life insurance, automobile insurance, and 
even insurance for livestock. This renders it challenging and problematic to implement.  
First of all, Aidoo et al. (2014) asserted that territorial or geographical interrelated 
risks involved in crop insurance make it even more challenging to insure it. When a 
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production risk occurs over a large area, yield losses could be huge, which will 
consequently generate a huge financial loss. This means that the risk attached to crop 
insurance could be devastating if a production risk affects crops over a large area. 
Contrastingly, the other forms of insurance address idiosyncratic risks that do not create 
high risks over a large area and creating huge financial loss. Secondly, the losses 
experienced in crop insurance is not stable but varies over time, and could vary from 
scanty, average to extreme losses. Karthikeyan (2005) portrayed this variability nature of 
crop insurance as a long tail distribution of losses. This distribution tail occurs when due 
to the variability in losses, farmers pay high premiums to insurance firms but with little 
occurrences of crop losses. Farmers then face the risk of paying high premiums to 
insurers.  
Additionally, Karthikeyan (2005) asserted that there are challenges that increase 
the administrative costs of insurers, which forces them to charge higher premiums 
beyond what farmers can afford to pay. He found that farmers with a high risk of crop 
loss most often choose to insure their crops than farmers who face low risks. This is 
because farmers know the state of their crops than the insurance firms. Such opposing 
selection choices make crop insurance unsustainable. Another difficulty is that farmers 
change their attitude towards observing precautionary measures to reduce the risk of crop 
loss after insuring their crops. Most farmers leave the crops unprotected knowing that a 
loss in yield will make them eligible for indemnity.  
Considering the challenges that traditional indemnity crop insurance faces, its 
implementation has not been successful throughout the world ( Aidoo et al., 2014). 
Consequently, Ramiro (2009) maintained that there has been a shift from the indemnity-
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based crop insurance to area yield index and lately to a weather index insurance to help 
discourse the difficulties of the indemnity-based crop insurance. Despite the shift, area 
yield crop insurance has not been sustainable due to technical and implementation issues 
(Karthikeyan, 2005).  
Karthikeyan (2005) found implementation problems in India such as reaching a 
small population of the farmers (less than 5 percent of the total number of farmers) and 
farmers receiving insurance based on whether they had taken loans from banks or not. 
Most of the farmers did not even know they were covered as farmers, especially 
borrowers were involuntarily covered. Karthikeyan (2005) also found that there was a 
level of opaqueness involved in the operations. Claims were made by assessing only a 
few farms, the results made to represent a big geographical area, typically a bloc and the 
results not published for public notice. Karthikeyan (2005) also found that farmers were 
made to pay similar amounts of crop insurance premiums although the faced different 
levels of risks. There was also the problem of paying indemnities late to farmers with the 
claim procedure lasting for between six months and two years. As noted by Aidoo et al. 
(2014), these implementation challenges cut the impact of the area yield-based crop 
insurance scheme.   
Some of the technical issues are that risks are more concentrated in a geographical 
area, current area yields could be exploited by politicians and farmers, there is no existing 
data of yield of crops per a geographical area and unpredictability of historical area yield 
data (Aidoo et al., 2014).  
Hess (2003) also identified that there exists an absence of variability. Hess (2003) 
used estimates between 1985/6 and 1999 to find a loss ratio of 5.72 (not including 
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administrative costs). He later found in 2002 that the claim to premium ratio was 4.17. 
This depicts that the use of crop insurance to hedge against crop risks is not viable. Hess 
(2003) also found administrative costs as very high in India because the system used to 
cut down crops for assessing the severity of crop loss. He also found that the payment of 
premiums was inequitable across different crops and states. Just like Karthikeyan (2005) 
found, Hess (2003) also determined that politicians largely interfere with this crop 
intervention as politicians used it as a way of winning over the people.  
The other alternative, weather-based crop insurance, has challenges as well. 
Karthikeyan (2005) determined that the apparent problem is the “basis risk”, which is the 
difference between the actual risk farmers face and the risk evaluated by the insurers. The 
efficiency of what the insurers are offering is reliant on the synergy of the day the policy 
was started and the owing date, and then calculating indemnity based on actual rainfall in 
each village (Karthikeyan (2005). Insurance companies in India rely on one bloc station 
to provide data on the weather for a large number of villages. This makes their data 
unreliable and difficult to predict weather patterns for each village over a large area. 
Karthikeyan (2005) also found that risk premiums were high in optimum sowing seasons 
were high because the risk of crop loss was high compared to insurers charging low 
premiums in lower yield seasons. Karthikeyan’s (2005) study in India also found that 
there was a lack of dependable weather data and weather recording instruments in many 
areas in the country. This reduces the participation levels and raises many questions about 
the feasibility of crop insurance.  
Similarly, Glauber (2004) in a study on vegetable farmers in Catalonia, Spain 
found that there is a low involvement in crop insurance. Glauber (2004) found a lowly 5 
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percent of vegetable farmers in Catalonia adopted crop insurance and about 20 percent 
for the whole of Spain. Diversification of risk, cost of insurance premiums, rules 
governing crop damage assessment and perception of risk were some of the factors 
affecting the vegetable farmers’ crop insurance participation levels in Catalonia (Glauber, 
2004). Enjolras et al. (2012) found that the use of crop insurance has leaned towards the 
added cost and low profit. Enjolras et al. (2012) indicated that due to the high cost over 
profit, countries like Italy and France substantially subsidize the payment of crop 
insurance. Equally, a study by Hazell et al. (1986) in Mexico and Panama found crop 
insurance greatly reduces the risk of low yields and incomes but can only be efficiently 
be achieved through government subsidization of crop insurance schemes. However, the 
cost of subsidizing insurance schemes by respective governments in developing countries 
have been decried in studies by Hazell et al. (1985), and Siamwalla and Valdes (1986; 
1992). They argued that government subsidies cause net social losses and as such 
subsidies may not be reasonable. They further explained that such funding could be 
invested in other sectors of the economy that would benefit society. Ray (1981) and 
Koropecky (1980) disproved the claims that government subsidies supporting crop 
insurance cause losses and argued that perhaps only “one side of the crop insurance 
subsidization story’ was painted. Ray (1981) and Koropecky (1980) asserted that 
government subsidies in crop insurance provide further support in agricultural-related 
investments such as research, price support, and conditions of perils from natural hazards. 
Additionally, the government has a social responsibility to seek to provide better living 
standards, and increasing the welfare of its citizens hence subsidizing crop insurance 
costs is not a misplaced investment (Ahsan & Kurian, 1985). 
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 Ahsan and Kurian (1985) determined that agricultural output increases with crop 
insurance compared to cases with no crop insurance schemes. The wellbeing of society 
improves when the government takes some burden off the cost of some risks (Ahsan and 
Kurian, 1985). Pomareda (1986), however, maintained that the efficiency of crop 
insurance implementation depends on its management, monitoring, and implementation. 
Richards (2000) in determining the demand for crop insurance in California, USA 
revealed that high premium charges reduce the incentive for more participation. Sargazi 
et al. (2013) in a study on effective factors that affect demand for insurance in Iran 
discovered that farmers that earn relatively higher incomes are more likely to adopt crop 
insurance, older farmers were found to be highly likely to insure their crops and years of 
farming experience proving to be insignificant in farmers’ decision to adopt crop 
insurance. Similarly, Karbasi and Kambozia (2003) in a study in Iran found the 
educational level of farmers to significantly affect how likely farmers are to insure their 
crops. Smith and Boqluet (1996) in a study conducted in Montana, USA determined that 
risk factors such as debt to banks, educational level of farmers, insurance premiums, and 
history of using crop insurance are sources of effective crop insurance.   
Crop insurance is not extensively used in Sub-Saharan Africa, except by large 
scale commercial farms (Kwadzo et al., 2013). Even in the case of commercial farms, it 
is only farm equipment, machinery, building and structure are some of the major items 
that are insured (Anaman, 1988). In Ghana, there is no crop insurance per se, but there is 
a pilot formal market-based insurance scheme that helps farmers to hedge against high 
production and marketing risk (Kwadzo et al., 2013).  
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2.2 Theoretical and Analytical Techniques  
To evaluate the demand for a hypothetical crop insurance scheme, the contingent 
valuation method (CVM), which is often used by researchers to value the preference 
levels of farmers for nonmarket commodities that do not have a defined price (Kealy & 
Turner, 1993; Breidert et al.,2006; Nganje et al., 2008; Taneja et al., 2014). 
 A review of the literature on willingness to pay for crop insurance has suggested 
several theories that can be used to evaluate a farmer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for 
agricultural insurance. Okoffo et al. (2016) determined that the stated preference 
(contingent valuation) theory, the revealed preference theory and, or a combination of 
theory based on microeconomic household variables and market variables to indirectly 
assess a suitable market premium have been used. The revealed preference theory 
assumes a substitutability relationship between a market good and not market well in a 
study (Nganje, Hearne, Gustafson, & Orth, 2008). Contingent valuation method, 
however, makes inquiries about respondents’ preferences (Nganje et al., 2008). 
 Okoffo et al. (2016) recommended the use of the contingent valuation theory to 
estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) of agricultural producer groups. Since there is 
little or no market information about such groups, using the contingent valuation theory is 
highly endorsed for use (Vandeveer and Loehman, 1994; Roe, Haab, & Sohngen, 2004; 
Bourgeon & Chambers, 2003; Carson, Flores, & Meade, n.d.; Noonan, 2003; Sarris et al., 
2006; Nganje et al., 2008; Liu and Zhang, 2011; Taneja et al., 2014).  
Mitchel and Carson (1989) elaborated on the importance of the contingent 
valuation theory by claiming that researchers use it to infer immediate responses from 
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research respondents to reveal their preferences for a good or service. To evaluate the 
theory, respondents are given a hypothetical situation to value. The value estimates are 
dependent on the hypothetical estimates (Carson, Flores, & Meade, n.d.). Eliminating 
biases such as theoretical, strategic and misspecification biases is crucial to reducing 
limitations of findings from a study. It is therefore vital that appropriate questions are 
asked to get corresponding responses and the level of awareness among the selected 
population of study to evaluate the true WTP.  
Otherwise, Cohen and Zilberman (1997) predicted that poor framing of questions 
and poor awareness among the research participants could create a considerable 
difference between predicted and actual WTP.   
Contingent Valuation critics argue that it appears a trivial task to ask people how 
much they are willing to pay for a service or good (Carson et al., n.d.). The critics, 
however, fail to appreciate that asking such questions is difficult. Since it is not so easy to 
measure consumer preferences, then critics should argue how plausible survey questions 
are to respondents. Given that premise, CVM can be said to violate economic theory to 
some extent if the questions are implausible. However, it is not reasonable to give survey 
questions a direct economic interpretation when a good or service is clearly defined or 
explained (Carson et al., 2000).   
Even if all the challenges raised by CVM critics are cleared, there exist two basic 
limitations (Sagoff, 1994). WTP evaluations are limited by wealth. Many believe that 
government responsibility should not be influenced by any ability to afford or not.  
Provisions should be made as and when they are needed (Sagoff, 1994; Carson et al., 
2000). Also, the theory only considers the preferences of the current generation and not 
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future generations. Sagoff (1994) argued that whatever these limitations could mean, they 
do not influence the measurement of economic value.   
Although there have been heated arguments about contingent valuation, it has 
been productive. The contentious issues raised by critics have evolved to support the 
view that using contingent valuation properly in a study provides a reasonable basis for 
evaluating the opportunity cost of obtaining a good or service (Carson et al., 2000).    
Concerning agriculture, the use of the contingent valuation theory helps to evaluate 
farmers’ awareness and WTP for introducing novel goods and services before deciding 
on prices. Although ideal for firms and consumers, it also allows governments to appraise 
and review its policies to a sector of the economy. For example, the CVM has been 
applied to works relating to natural resources and in supplying water in developing 
countries as applied by Ahmed et al. (2002) in Bangladesh. Notwithstanding the debate 
on the methods and application of CVM, a necessary condition to achieve the objective 
of CVM is to find out the factors that affect farmers’ willingness to invest in a particular 
good or service, and a significant variety of other topics (Noonan, 2003). Thus, in an 
agricultural context, the CVM enables researchers to define the nonmarket preferences of 
farmers. It is not surprising to note that many researchers have employed the CVM to 
create the relationship between WTP and the characteristics of the survey population and 
other topics (Mwangi, 1998).   
A lot of the variations in the application of CVM has been reflected by the 
differences in the quality of research conducted (Noonan, 2003). Often, it is common for 
researchers to ignore some of the NOAA guidelines presented by Arrow (1993) and other 
experts. For example, financial limitations and practicability of the study often force 
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researchers to abandon the qualified guidelines. The literature on CVM acknowledges 
many problems that affect research outcomes. Schwer and Daneshwary (1995) pointed 
out a lower response level, Holt et al. (1999) found a “questionable good” and Glass et al. 
(1999) finding that goods that are defined poorly as examples of the problems affecting 
the quality of research. Noonan (2003) noted that the case of the poorly defining good is 
frequent. For example, the Kansas Arts Commission asked respondents about increasing 
the number of arts in their local area without detailed information on the rudiments of the 
increase (Glass et al., 1999). Other research works indicate the degree of a change in 
activity by presuming some information of the existing quantity (Papandrea, 1999; 
Thompson et al., 2002). Research by Bille Hansen (1997) only asked respondents how 
much they are willing to pay as tax when the government increases spending in any area 
of the economy. The differences in research quality are directly affected by the validity of 
the estimates in a study. The validity of the estimates, therefore, needs to be assessed on 
individual research works.   
Applications and determinants of CVM 
Ulimwengu and Sanyal (2011) in a study conducted in Uganda, used a 
multivariate probit model to evaluate farmers’ WTP for farming services such as disease 
control, crop protection, soil fertility management, and marketing. The study found that 
farmers’ previous use of service, lack of land and income reduced their WTP. Generally, 
the level of awareness affects the choices made by a farmer or a consumer. However, 
research by De Chaisemartin and Mahe (2009) established that farmers’ degree of 
awareness did not affect their WTP. 
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 In a research conducted in Rwanda by Haba (2004), farmers’ level of education 
and corporative membership was perceived to provide more information about the goods 
or services on offer. She, therefore, concluded that WTP decreases with farmers’ 
educational level and time of being a member of a coffee corporative group.  
Haba (2004) also found that farmers’ WTP for agriculture delivery technology was 
strongly correlated with many of their demographic traits such as age, gender, 
educational level, number of dependents, marital status, corporative membership period, 
income, etc.). She observed that age and gender greatly correlated with WTP as younger 
male farmers showed more WTP and 48% of respondents said it is the government’s 
responsibility to provide agricultural technology to farmers. Paralleling it to research 
conducted in Southeast Asia, farmers considered the provision of agricultural extension 
services as a responsibility of the government (Ali et al., 2008). Cohen and Zilberman 
(n.d.) found that there are problems inherent with WTP measures in assessing a market’s 
technology potential. They argued that respondents were inexperienced with 
technological services. This means that adopters will have to see or feel what is being 
offered to make good choices. Cohen and Zilberman (n.d) asserted that such 
misinformation underestimates the validity of a study.  
The price of many nonmarket commodities has been evaluated using CVM. 
Alberini et al. (1997) used CVM to value the health effects of air pollution in Taiwan by 
using dichotomous choice questions to estimate the maximum likelihood (interval -data 
model) of a respondent having a health issue through air pollution. The authors found that 
WTP increases with income and education. Similarly, research conducted by Chesnut et 
al. (1998) to evaluate the health effects of air pollution in Bangkok using CVM and 
The Willingness of Cocoa Farmers to Insure Their Farms Against Production Risks – The 




modeled as OLS and Tobit regressions. Chesnut et al. (1998) determined that age, 
education, and income affected WTP.  
Anjum Altaf and Hughes (1994) used CVM to measure the demand for sanitation 
in Burkina Faso and used a probit regression model to conclude that households with a 
pit in a good condition had a greater WTP compared to those who had no improved pit. 
Altaf et al. (1993) conducted research in Punjab, Pakistan on rural water supply using 
CVM. The authors modeled survey data using a dichotomous choice (elicitation method) 
and found WTP to increase with income. Similar research on improving water quality in 
Davao, Philippines by Choe, Whittington and Lauria (1996) also used CVM to estimate 
the maximum likelihood (interval -data model) and found that WTP increased with the 
welfare of participants.  
In India, Hadker et al. (1997) used CVM to evaluate the WTP for Borivli National 
park and found no correlation between WTP and income using the double-bounded 
interval data model to estimate the maximum likelihood of participation. 
 Okoffo et al. (2016) in research on cocoa farmer’s willingness to pay for 
agricultural insurance and insurance companies’ willingness to sell agricultural insurance 
products in Ghana found WTP to increase with age, marital status and education by using 
a double hurdle model. Similar research was conducted in Nigeria by Falola, Ayinde and 
Agboola (2013) used the CVM to evaluate the factors affecting cocoa farmer’s 
willingness to use agricultural insurance and found WTP to increase with age, 
educational level, income and access to inputs by using the probit model regression.  
This study uses the probit model regression to estimate the significance of the variables in 
the dataset. However, logistic regression is modeled simultaneously to confirm the prior 
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assumption as determined by Caudill and Jackson (1989) and Greene (1999). that the 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
.  The research was conducted in two parts. . The first part involves primary data 
collection via questionnaires and interviews. The second part uses the data from the first 
part to estimate a relevant empirical model. In the first part, the study area, sampling 
technique and size and instrument for data collection and the type of data needed for the 
study are discussed. The second part focuses on the empirical model of the study.  
 
3.2 The Study Area 
The study was conducted in the Upper West Akim Constituency of the Eastern 
Region of Ghana. The population of Upper West Akyem District, according to the 2010 
Population and Housing Census is 87,051 representing 3.3 percent of the region’s total 
population. As high as 74.0 percent of households in the district are engaged in 
agriculture Ghana Statistical Service, 2010). In the rural localities, eight out of ten 
households (82.5%) are agricultural households while in the urban localities, 52.5 percent 
of households are into agriculture. Most households in the district (96.3%) are involved 
in crop farming (Ghana Statistical Service, 2010).  
Adeiso is the capital of the Upper West Akim. It lies between longitudes 0 
degrees 25 minutes West and 0 degrees 47 minutes West and latitudes 5 degrees 40 
minutes North (Ghana Statistical Service, 2010). It shares boundaries with Ayensuano 
District to the east, West Akim Municipality to the north, Nsawam Adoagyiri 
Municipality to the southeastern part, Ga South Municipality to the south and Awutu-
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Afutu Senya District in the Central region to the west. The Upper West Akim District is 
the only district in the Eastern Region that shares boundaries with the Central and Greater 
Accra Regions. It has a total land size of about 342.3 km2. 
The District has an appreciable undulating high and low lands with the highest 
point being at Adeiso which rises to about 500m above sea level and a bi-modal rainy 
season. The bi-modal rainy reaches its peak between April-July and September-October. 
The district experiences an annual rainfall between 1,250 mm to 1,750 mm (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2019).  
The temperature ranges between 26 degrees Celcius and 30 degrees Celcius 
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). The climate is conducive for agricultural activities: 
cash crops and food crops (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). The district has high forests 
that are rich in timber and other forest products(Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). The 
district has a mist mini-deciduous forest with predominant reddish-brown, well-drained, 
deep gravel-free silty loams and silty clay loams (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). The 
presence of the forest makes it possible for the district to experience double maxima 
rainfall throughout the year. The rapid expansion of the cocoa and oil palm industries in 
the district is changing the original forest into a secondary type (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2010). This vegetaion pevents erosion from taking place to maintain the nutrient 
level in the soil. This makes cocoa grow well in the area.  
The district is endowed with rich soils that make it suitable for farming activities 
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). According to the 2010 Population and Housing Census, 
households engaged in agriculture in the district are 15,014 (74%) of the total households 
in agriculture (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). More than half (52.5%) of the urban 
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households are engaged in agricultural activities compared to a higher percentage of 
(82.5%) of the rural households who are engaged in agricultural activities (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2013). The major economic activity in the district is crop farming and 
tree planting followed by livestock and fish farming (Ghana Statistical Service, 2010). 
Farmers in the district cultivate food crops like cassava, maize, plantain, cocoyam, and 
yam and cash crops like cocoa, oil palm, coffee and citrus on the land (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2013). 
Due to the bimodal nature of rainfall patterns, farmers in the district depend on 
the vast river sources during the dry season to cultivate food crops such as tomatoes, 
okra, and vegetables. It has River Ayensu as the main river that drains through from 
Ayensuano District in the eastern part of the district to join the Central Region in the 
west.  
Figure 1  
Map of Upper West Akyem District  
Source (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2010). 
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3.21 Sample Size And Sampling Technique 
Cocoa farmers were the main target population of this study. A total of 113 cocoa 
farmers were randomly selected and interviewed in the study area. The study used a 
purposive sampling technique to select the study area whilst the subjects were randomly 
selected for interviews once the study areas was selected. Three cocoa-growing towns 
namely Kofi Asare, Ampofo and Darmang were purposively selected as the study areas 
due to the high number of cocoa farmers in those communities.  
The Eastern Region of Ghana was chosen because of its rich history in cocoa 
production. Cocoa production was started in the Eastern Region of Ghana after the 
introduction of the cocoa crop in 1879 (Hay & Okali 1985; Amanor & Hill, 2000). The 
Eastern Region of Ghana produced an average of 55714.95 tonnes between 1948 and 
2017 cocoa seasons (Ghana Cocoa Board). In that period (1948-2017), the Eastern 
Region was only behind Western Region (148120.2 tonnes), Ashanti Region (108049.5 
tonnes), Brong Ahafo Region (65726.34 tonnes) on average. Considering the region’s 
contribution to the Ghanaian cocoa industry, it was justifiable to conduct such a study in 
the region.  
 
3.22. Instruments For Data Collection 
A pre-evaluated semi-structured questionnaire was used as the major instrument 
for the study. The questionnaire consisted close-ended and partially close-ended 
questions. The survey data was collected in March 2020.  
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3.23 Data Collection 
Both primary and secondary data were sourced for this study. The semi-structured 
questionnaire was used to collect the primary data from cocoa farmers in the study area. 
Secondary data from both the literature and websites relevant to the study and documents 
were used for this study. 
3.3 Descriptive Analysis 
Utility maximation is the basic theory behind this study. The cocoa farmer does 
not only contemplate the best out of the new innovation or technology but on how to 
achieve a satisfying utility level when a farmer makes a decision on whether to accept 
new technology or not (McConnel et al, 2009). Sadoulet et al. (1996) determined that 
consumers have a level of utility they want to attain, and so they tend to make choices 
according to their level of utility. For example, considering a number of utility levels say 
“U”, a cocoa farmer will make a choice according to their maximum level of utility given 
her budget (Lubungu et al., 2012).  
Given the utility of a cocoa farmer as Uij, from selecting a preference q, a cocoa 
farmer will select an alternative on whether or not they are willing to accept crop 
insurance or not. The cocoa farmers’ choices will rely on their relative utility levels 
associated with the two options given (Lubungu et al., 2012).  
Generally, the choice of the cocoa farmer (regarding whether to get crop 
insurance or not) will be considered as a binary result;  
 qi Î q = {1 if J >0, 0 otherwise}…………………………………… Equation 1  
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where qi is the given alternative (two choices of an ith observation, i=1, 2, 3…., q is the 
farmer, q=1,2,3…. J is the difference in the utilities of acceptance and non-acceptance.  
The study assumed that a cocoa farmer’s choice: acceptance and non-acceptance 
of crop insurance will depend on their maximum utility level. This means that if a cocoa 
farmer decides that accepting crop insurance brings him a maximum level of utility, then 
he/she will choose such an option.  
Given equation (1), the categorical data or choices of acceptance of farmers were 
modeled to dummy variables to represent numeric variables. The difference in utility 
acceptance or non-acceptance is the dependent variable in the model. 
 
3.4 Empirical Model 
          Econometrically, the study is modeled  to evaluate the factors that influence 
willingness to use crop insurance. A probit and logistic regression is modeled to evaluate 
the significant levels of factors influencing the willingness to accept or not is displayed 
as: 
 
𝑊𝑇𝐶𝐼=𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑑𝑢Level + 𝛽5𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 
𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐶𝑟𝐴 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 + 𝑢…………. …………………..Equation 2  
Where Gender is the gender of a cocoa farmer,  
MaritalStat is the marital status of a cocoa farmer,  
Age is the age of a household head,  
Edu is the educational level of a cocoa farmer,  
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HHsize is the household size of a cocoa farmer,  
SizeCrA is the size of the crop area owned by a farmer measured in acres  
Income is the income earned by a cocoa farmer from a cocoa season  
IncOther is another income source of farmers.  
u is the error term. 
3.41 Description Of Variables 
Gender of a cocoa farmer(Gender). The gender of a farmer was measured as a 
dummy variable: male = 1, otherwise =0. Gender was put forward as a positive variable 
because male farmers have greater access to ownership of land than females in Ghanaian 
farming communities (Amanor & Hill, 2000). Therefore, the study assumed males are 
more likely to accept crop insurance.  
Marital Status of a cocoa farmer(MaritalStat). The marital status of a farmer was 
measured as a dummy variable: married = 1, not married= 0. The study posited the 
marital status of a cocoa farmer to be positive because the study assumed that married 
farmers are concerned about how their families will survive should  an unexpected risk 
happens (Danso-Abbeam et al, 2014). It was, therefore, assumed that  farmers who had 
spouses were more likely to use crop insurance their counterparts who are not.  
Age of a cocoa farmer(Age). The age of a cocoa farmer was measured in years. 
The study posited that age has a negative correlation with the willingness to accept crop 
insurance because there is a high chance that younger farmers will accept crop insurance 
than older cocoa farmers. Baidu-Forson (1999) determined that older farmers tend to use 
their experience and commit to primitive ways of farming than adopt innovative ideas.  
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The education level of a cocoa farmer (EduLevel). The study postulated that 
cocoa farmers who have attained some level of education are able to analyze technology 
and make decisions (Annan, 2015). The study further hypothesized that cocoa farmers 
with formal education were more likely to accept crop insurance.  
Household size of a farmer(HHsize). The study assumed that the size of a 
household either positively or negatively influenced a farme’s willingness to accept crop 
insurance. The study hypothesized that farmers with bigger household sizes would rather 
spend more money on the family than direct investment into crop insurance. Smaller 
households, however, consider the situation of the family in case an uncertain risk 
happens.  
Size of crop area (s𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐶𝑟𝐴). The size of land containing the cocoa crop was 
measured in acres. The study assumed that a farmer who owns a small crop land is less 
likely to accept crop insurance. Contrastingly, cocoa cocoa farmers that have big crop 
lands are more likely to accept crop insurance because large crop areas are difficult to 
manage and that the effect of the uncertain occurrence of risks such as infection black 
pods will be greater compared to smaller sized crop areas.  
Income from cocoa farming (Income). The study assumed income of cocoa 
farmers received from a cocoa season to influence their willingness to accept crop 
insurance or not. The income of farmers was measured by looking at the quantity of 
kilograms of cocoa beans sold in the year 2018 multiplied by the price of per kilogram. 
The study posited that farmers who earn higher incomes were more likely to accept crop 
insurance than their counterparts who earned less. 
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The income of a cocoa farmer from other sources (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟). The study 
hypothesizeD income from other sources as positive. This was because income from 
other sources increased the income levels of cocoa farmers. Therefore, cocoa farmers 
who received higher other incomes to get a higher total accumulated income were more 
likely to accept crop insurance. 
3.5 Data Analysis 
       STATA and Excel are the statistical software that were used to analyze the data. Data 
was cleaned, summarized, organized and then inputted into an excel worksheet. A 
summary statistic of all variables was run using excel. This gave a quantitative 
description of the dataset which includes where the average lies and whether or not some 
of the data were skewed. A correlation matrix of the data set was run to find if there was 
a collinearity between some of the variables or not 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
           This chapter analyses the survey data collated from the field survey. STATA and 
R statistical tool are used to run a regression to evaluate the determinants that affect the 
willingness of cocoa farmers to adopt crop insurance. 
 
4.2 Socio-economic Characteristics of the Respondents 
Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of the research subjects. 
Proportionally, male respondents were more than female respondents with 78.8% of the 
respondent’s males and 21.2% females. Most of the respondents' age ranges between 55 
and 64 years, 45 and 54 years, 35 and 44 and above 65 years represented 25.7%, 23%, 
20.4% and 18.6% of the total cocoa farmers respectively. Only 12.4 % of the respondents 
were aged between 25 and 34 years. On average, the farmers were about 52.76 years old, 
the minimum age about 29.5 years old and the maximum age about 77.5 years.  
A substantial (77%) number of the cocoa farmers have married whiles 23% were 
unmarried (12.3% were divorced, 8% widowed and 2.7 single). A majority (52.2%) of 
the cocoa farmers had a household size of between six (6) and 10 whiles 35.4% had a 
household size of between one (1) and five (5). Only 12.4% of the cocoa farmers had a 
household size of above 11. A majority (83.2) of the cocoa farmers had received formal 
education with 42.5% receiving Senior High School or Middle School education, 38.9% 
attending Basic School or Junior High School, and a lowly (1.8%) receiving tertiary 
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education whiles 16.8% not receiving formal education at all. Table 1 shows that 38.9% 
have little experience in cocoa farming, having done farming for fewer than 10 years of, 
while 61.1% of the respondents have been  doing cocoa farming for more than  10 years.  
Table 1  
Cocoa farmers’ demographic characteristics  
Variable                                                   Description                  Percentage (%) 
Gender                                                           Male                                          78.8 
                                                                       Female                                      21.2 
Age                                                                25-34                                         12.4 
                                                                       35-44                                         20.4 
                                                                       45-54                                         23 
                                                                       55-64                                         25.7 
                                                                       Above or equal to 65                18.6 
Marital status                                                 Single                                        2.7 
                                                                       Married                                     77 
                                                                       Widowed                                   8 
                                                                       Divorced                                   12.4 
Household size                                               1-5                                            35.4 
                                                                        6-10                                          52.2 
                                                                       Above or equal to 11                12.4 
Level of education                                         No education                            16.8 
                                                                        Primary/J.H. S                         38.9 
                                                                        Secondary/Middle school        42.5 
                                                                        Tertiary                                    1.8 
Years of farming experience in cocoa            Less than 10                             38.9 
                                                                        10-20                                        38.1            
                                                                        21-30                                        12.4 
                                                                        31-40                                         6.2 
                                                                        Above 40                                   4.4  
    
Source: Data from field survey (2020). 
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4.3 Major Cocoa Production Risks That Affect Cocoa Farmers 
Table 2 shows the production risks recognized and experienced by cocoa farmers in the 
study area. From Table 2, it was identified that the most production risk that affects cocoa 
yield in the study area are insect pest and disease (95.6%), drought (88.5%), variation in 
yield (87.6%), poor access to inputs (73.5%), too high temperature (69%), high prices of 
farm inputs (66.4%), aging cocoa farmer (50.4%) and excess rain (32.7%).  
Table 2  
Production risks faced by cocoa farmers from the study  
Variable                                                          Percentage (%) 
Bush fire                                                            19.5 
Drought                                                              88.5 
Variation in yield                                               87.6 
Insect pests and diseases                                    95.6 
Poor access to inputs                                         73.5 
High prices of farm inputs                                 66.4 
Excess rain                                                         32.7 
Too high temperature                                         69 
Illegal chain saw activities                                 8 
Flood                                                                   1.8 
Galamsey                                                            0.9 
Aging cocoa farmer                                            50.4 
 
Source: Data from field survey (2020). 
 
The majority of the cocoa farmers identified drought and erratic rainfall as one of 
the major production risks they face. A possible reason could be climate change effects 
on agricultural farmlands. The cocoa farmers identified that most of the cocoa crops die 
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during the drought periods, leaving them no option but to replace or replant most of their 
cocoa crops again when they experience rainfall. Surprisingly, erratic rainfall affects the 
cocoa pods. The respondents acknowledged that the cocoa pods “absorb” water during 
erratic rainfall periods and making it difficult for the cocoa beans to mature prematurely. 
Some of the respondents recalled their unfortunate experiences with bush fires. The 
unlucky farmers who have been affected by bush fires said that bush fires completely 
destroy the cocoa farms. This leaves farmers helpless and poor. The respondents 
associated the cause of bush fires in the study area to game activities. Individuals who 
hunt for “bush meat” during the drought periods start bush fires by using fire as a hunting 
tool. On the flip side, 50.4% of the cocoa farmers noted that aging cocoa farmers are a 
risk to cocoa production. 
Climatic changes affect production yields in the study area. The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) year defined climate change as 
when human activities change the structure of atmospheric conditions (Protocol, 1997).. 
This change causes inconsistencies in climate over some time periods (Protocol, 1997). 
With cocoa production adding value to the Ghanaian economy through the creation of 
employment and foreign exchange, natural climate variability would affect cocoa output 
levels. The spatial and intermittent variations in rainfall patterns which are evidenced by 
frequent droughts and erratic rainfall are among the most damaging factors affecting the 
cocoa output (IPCC, 2014 & Laux et al., 2010). 
 There was drastic reduction in total cocoa production from 5000kg to 2000kg in 
2003  due to effects of climatic change on cocoa farmlands (Codjoe et al., 2013). Nature 
provides the natural resources needed to effectively manage cocoa (Codjoe et al., 2013). 
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Particular important resources needed  are water, conditions of the soil, moisture, crop 
land, sunshine and humidity (Codjoe et al., 2013). Temperature, rainfall and the energy 
provided by the sun directly affects agricultural farmlands, which affects production yield 
and the physical structure of plants (Mollaee et al., 2020; Codjoe et al., 2013).  
 The respondents in the study area complained of how no or little rainfall and 
erratic rainfall patterns reduce cocoa yield. It is not surprising to see from Table 2 that 
Variation in yield 87.6% of the respondents experienced the risk of variation in yield. 
Longe and Oyekale (2013) asserted that farmers complained of serious drought and 
inconsistent rainfall affecting the growth of seedlings and reduction in crop yields. 
 During the cocoa seed development stage, an insufficient supply of soil water 
results in increased seed mortality (Anim Kwapong & Frimpong, 2004). The authors also 
found that the cocoa bean size is greatly affected when there is not enough soil water, and 
hence affecting the quality of cocoa beans. Wessel and Quist-Wessel (2015) found that 
heavy rains that fall between August and October do not allow the cocoa trees to produce 
enough flowers and also the cocoa pods absorb water during the pod filling stage. The 
cocoa beans harvested are affected. This reduces farmers’ revenue from the farm.This 
affects the quality of the cocoa beans produced by farmers, and consequently cuts their 
income. 
Codjoe et al. (2013) established that climate change affects how pest and 
pathogen grow, changes the physical properties of the host plant by weakening host 
resistance. A possible effect is that hosts and pathogens will modify to be survive in 
different geographical locations, which will increase crop losses and reduce crop yield 
(Codjoe et al., 2013). Codjoe et al. (2013) determined that such pest and pathogen 
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modifications would likely disturb the livelihood of the farmer, revenue and decision 
making on managing the farm.   
In most cocoa-growing communities in Ghana,  majority of farmers are not able 
to afford the cost of farm inputs or do not get access to purchase farm inputs that will 
enable them increase crop yield (Onumah et al., 2014). Wegner (2012) emphasized that 
improving cocoa farmers’ access to basic cocoa production inputs such as fertilizers, 
spraying machines, wellington boots, pruners, rakes and insecticides/pesticides is key to 
enabling farmers to grow quality and high yielding crops every year. Wegner (2012) 
asserts that the most concern of smallholder cocoa farmers is to get access to credit 
facilities and farm inputs. Cocoa activities are seasonal. It therefore relies on easy access 
to farm resources to be able to guard against pest, disease and rotting of cocoa beans that 
cause low yields (Onumah et al., 2014). Output or yield could be increased for farmers if 
they have access to credit facilities to enable them buy inputs such as fertilizers, 
insecticides/pesticides, employ labor, fuel, spraying machines among others. However, 
Grossman and Tarazi (2014) determined that smallholder farmers in developing cocoa-
producing countries find it difficult to get access to loan facilities. With cocoa being a 
seasonal crop, many cocoa farmers tend to borrow to help them purchase inputs and cater 
for their families before harvest (Lundstedt & Parssinen, 2009). Lundstedt and Parssinen 
(2009) determined that the access to loan facility challenge makes farmers borrow up to 
about 60 percent of their harvest income. A 2012 World Bank report indicated that access 
to financial credit is limited in developing countries. The report likened the cause to 
majority of farmers in  developing countries being subsistent farmers which limit their 
financial capability to purchase farm inputs and household needs (World Bank, 2012). 
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Due to this extreme financial problems farmers face, farmers do not get the required 
finance needed to buy the necessary inputs to increase output levels and quality cocoa 
beans, as well as adopt new and better technologies. Table 2 showed 66.4 percent of  
farmers to have grumbled about high input prices.  
Generally, input suppliers only sell cocoa inputs  to farmers who have “ready 
cash” to make purchases (Onumah et al., 2014). This is because the input suppliers regard 
cocoa farmers as a big risk because their income source is seasonal (Onumah et al., 
2014). Only a few Cocoa farmers get access to inputs as the vast majority are priced off. 
Although the private sector dominates the sale and distribution of cocoa farm inputs, 
COCOBOD extremely subsidizes the price of fertilizer, insecticide and pesticide 
distribution  to increase output levels (World Bank, 2011; Onumah et al., 2014). ). World 
Bank (2011) further observed that the Cocoa Disease and Pest Control (CODAPEC) unit 
of the COCOBOD through the Mass Spraying Exercise initiative distributes 
agrochemicals to cocoa farmers. However, to increase output levels, cocoa farmers were 
allowed to use as much quantities of agrochemicals they wish to use. Although 
COCOBOD greatly subsidizes the distribution of farm inputs, cocoa farmers still make 
significant contributions to the cost of production (Onumah et al., 2014. 
 From table 2, 73.5 percent of the respondents complained of having poor access 
to farm input. A lot of the farmers said that the cocoa Mass Spraying Exercise was not 
enough as they often insect pest and disease again. Some also reported that the last time 
they received supplies from the CODAPEC dates back to 2016. 80.3%  of the farmers 
mentioned that they receive most of their agrochemicals and other farm inputs from a 
private supplier called Cocoa Life Ghana. Launched in 2012, the company gives farmers 
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training, cocoa management skills and a promise for a bright future for the next 
generation of cocoa (Cocoa Life Ghana, n.d).  A study by Hainmueller et al. (2011) 
supported this report from the farmers in the study area when they found that there 
provision of  inputs for cocoa farmers in Ghana is not enough and are distributed late. 
Hainmueller et al. (2011) further reveal that a lowly 14 percent of cocoa farmers in 
Ghana get farm inputs when need it.  
The International Cocoa Organization (2007) reports that the world’s cocoa yield 
have generally increased. Baah and Anchirinah (2011) asserted that the upward trend was 
a result of higher production prices, support programs from government, fertilizer credits, 
allowing private suppliers to supply inputs, liberalizing the internal market, stabilizing 
prices  and management of pest and disease. However, insect pests and diseases are 
prevalent in cocoa-growing areas which affect output levels.  
One of the causes of the reduction of yield levels is the prevalence of  insect pest 
and disease because of poor management (Dormon et al., 2004). The Ghanaian cocoa 
sector is plagued by one major group of insect pests and two major plant diseases (Baah 
& Anchirinah, 2011).  An example of insect pest of cocoa is the mirid that attack a 
growing cocoa tree. The two prevalent diseases are Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease 
(CSSVD) and the black pod disease which attack the growth and ripening of cocoa pods 
(Asante, 1995). It is estimated that insect pest and disease cause 30%  loss in global 
output every year and a loss  between  10% and 80% of individual farm (Duguma et al., 
1998; Lass, 2004; Dormon et al., 2007).  
From table 2, 95.6% of  admitted facing incidence of insect pest and disease. 
Economically, farmers’ cocoa farm income levels reduce due to the prevalence of mirids.  
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Mirids is the insect pest that affects cocoa farmers a lot in terms of economic losses in 
Ghana (Antwi-Agyakwa, 2013).  
The livelihood of cocoa farmers is threatened by the production risks (pre and 
post-harvest) as these risks increase unemployment and worsen poverty rates in 
smallholder cocoa-growing communities. This also decreases Ghana’s foreign income 
earnngs.  
Smallholder cocoa farmers do not have adequate access to the support systems 
that could enable them to incresase crop yield (Onumah et al., 2014). A UNDP (2010) 
scoping paper reported that cocoa production requires a lot of labor-intensive efforts 
because a lot of modernized technology is not suited to cocoa production. Therefore, the 
source of labor used by a cocoa farmer could increase or decrease their output levels on 
the farm to some extent. Heshmati and Mulugata (1996) found that both family source of 
labor and hired labor (popularly called “part-day” in Ghana) also increases productivity. 
Onumah et al., (2010), however, found that both family source of labor and hired labor 
provided similar levels of productivity in the Ghanaian fish farming industry. The 
majority of the respondents were old and aging with 23% aged between 45 and 54 years, 
25.7% aged between 55 and 64 years and 18.6% are more than 64 years old (Table 2). 
Consequently, the level of output in the sector will reduce in the future as old cocoa 
farmers will not have the strength and energy to work on the farm.  
 The cocoa output levels are more likely to reduce at areas across where the study 
was conducted is nothing is done to change the demographic distribution in area of the 
research. This trend is consistent with the Government of Ghana’s generation gap” fear, 
that threatens yield of cocoa and productivity in Ghana (Onumah et al., 2014). From table 
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2, Only 12.4 % of the farmers are youthful (aged between 25 and 34 years). Cocoa 
production is labor-intensive (Onumah et al., 2014). The study area is just about eight (8) 
miles from the industrial city of Accra, the capital city of Ghana. The youth could as well 
avoid the labor-intensive nature of cocoa production and rather migrate to Accra in 
search of non-existing jobs. Okoffo et al. (2016)  found that the level of apathy shown by 
Ghanaian youth to participate in farming activities is a structural problem that needs to be 
looked at until it greatly affects cocoa output in Ghana.                           
The cocoa sector in Ghana faces a lot of production risks that affect productivity 
levels. Salimonu and Falusi (2009)  found factors such as pest and disease, erratic rainfall 
and dry seasons as the most prevalent and important production risks faced by cocoa 
farmers. Le and Cheong (2009) also found production risk as one of the most important 
risks farmers experience. Production risks that result in low yields threaten the survival of 
smallholder cocoa farmers. With low yields, unemployment levels will increase, poverty 
levels increase and income from foreign exports decrease consequently. Cocoa farmers 
depend heavily on the monetary returns they earn to cover their expenses such as paying 
for medical bills, providing good nutrition for their households, paying school fees and 
general living expenses. Crop losse cause the children of smallholder farmers to quit 
school, are not able to buy enough food, becomes undernourished and poor health of the 
household (Okoffo et al. (2016).  
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4.4 Distribution Of Respondents’ Awareness Of Insurance Schemes And Type Of 
Insurance Used. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate farmers’ general awareness levels on general insurance 
products and the type of insurance schemes they use. It was found that no cocoa farmer in 
the study area has ever bought a crop insurance product. Out of the 113 farmers samples, 
83.9%  already know that there is general insurance policies in Ghana whiles 16.1% have 
no idea what an insurance scheme is. 54.86% of farmers have registered on the Ghana 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), followed by life policy (2.65%) and Tigo 
(telecommunication network in Ghana) insurance (2.65%) and no farmer using 
automobile insurance. The farmers who used any of the insurance products said that 
being insured helped them to reduce their medical costs should they fall sick.  
Figure 2 
Percentage of cocoa farmers’ awareness of insurance schemes in the study area.  
 
 Source: Data from field survey (2020).  
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Type of insurance schemes used by cocoa farmers in the study area. 
 
Source: Data from field survey (2020).  
 
4.5 Cocoa Farmers’ Awareness, Sources Of Information And Willingness To Take 
Crop Insurance Schemes 
Table 3 shows farmers’ knowledge of crop insurance, where and how they get 
information on crop insurance and their willingness to adopt crop insurance or not. About 
15% of the farmers strongly had knowledge about crop insurance, 12.4%  partially aware, 
11.5% fairly aware whiles a many (61.1%) had no prior knowledge about crop insurance 
at all. Overall, 38.9% of the farmers  had prior knowledge about crop insurance. The 
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Organization (FBO) (61.4%), Media (45.5%) and Agricultural Extension Agents (AEA) 
(81.8%).   
Table 3  
Distribution of cocoa farmers according to their awareness, sources of information and 
willingness to take crop insurance. 
Item  Number of 
Respondents  
Percentage  
Level of awareness about crop 
insurance  
Strongly aware  
Partially aware  
Fairly aware  













Sources of Information on crop 
insurance 
Farm Based Organizations  
Media  









Willingness to take crop 
insurance  
Willing  








Source: Data from field survey (2020). 
Despite the majority (61.1%) of the farmers having no knowedge about ccrop 
insurance, a majority (93.8%) of the farmers agreed to use crop insurance. This shows 
that cocoa farmers highly appreciate the benefits of crop insurance. Most of the farmers 
believed that with crop insurance, they could be protected against production risks. Only 
6.2% of the farmers were not willing to use crop insurance. The farmers indicated 
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financial constraint (85.7%) and culture of sticking to primitive ways of farming (85.7%) 
as the major reasons for not adopting crop insurance.  
4.6 Farmers’ Distribution Of Prices They Are Willing To Take Crop Insurance 
And The Amount To Pay To Use Crop Insurance. 
  Table 4 
Cocoa Farmers’ Distribution of Prices Willing to Take Agricultural Insurance and the 
amount to pay to use crop insurance. 
Variable  Description  Percentage (%) 
 
 
Percentage (%) of total production cost/acre/annum 















Price farmer is willing pay as insurance 














Minimum premium farmers are willing to 
pay/acre/annum 
GHS35.00  
Average amount farmers are willing to 
pay/acre/annum 
GHS44.29  
Source: Data from field survey (2020). 
Cocoa farmers’ distribution of prices per annum they are willing to adopt crop 
insurance are showed in Table 4. A lot (91.6%) of farmers could afford to use crop 
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insurance by using less than 10 percent of their production expenses, while only 8.4 
percent were willing to pay insurance premiums from 10 percent of their production cost. 
Farmers were willing to pay GH¢150.00 as the highest amount of premium and 
GH¢35.00 as the least amount as premium. On average, farmers were willing to pay 
GH¢44.29 to use crop insurance. Those who were indecisive refered to a lack of capital 
and awareness on crop insurance. 
4.7 Determinants of Cocoa Farmer’s Willingness to Take Agricultural Insurance 
Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficients from both the logistic and probit 
regression. However, the coefficients cannot be interpreted as a linear model because the 
dependent variable (willingness) in this study has a binary outcome (willing 1, otherwise 
0). Therefore, the magnitude of the coefficients cannot be interpreted because the logit 
and probit coefficients differ by a scale factor (Katchova, 2016). Unlike the coefficients 
which are different for logit and probit, the marginal effects are almost identical in the 
logistic and probit models reported in columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 (Greene, 1999; 
Katchova, 2016). However, the signs of the marginal effects and coefficients are similar 
for probit and logistic models 5 (Greene, 1999; Katchova, 2016).  
From Table 5, Columns 3 and 4 are the marginal effects on the binary outcome of the 
logistic and probit regression respectively. The marginal effects were calculated using the 
chain rule and modeled using STATA and R statistical software For the logistic 
regression, the inverse of the logit function was modeled to change the linear predictions 
into probabilities. The estimated coefficients were then multiplied by the probability 
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density function of the linked distribution (also the derivative of the cumulative density 
function). Per Kleiber and Zeileis’ (2008) proposal, this paper used the sample marginal  
effect to calculate the probit and logistic marginal effects. 
 
 
Source: Data from field suvey (2020). 
Independent 
Variable  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 




























































































































Summary of binary probit and logistic coefficients estimates and marginal effects of cocoa 
farmers’ willingness to use crop insurance. 
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Note: Number of observations:  113  
McFadden Pseudo R-Squared : 0.2135 
Significant codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
 
A probit and logistic model was used to evaluate the determinants influencing the 
willingness of cocoa farmers in the Upper West Akyem District in the Eastern Region of 
Ghana. The explanatory variables were gender, marital status, age, educational level, 
household size, size of crop area, income, and other income sources. From Table 5, the 
probit and logistic regression results and the marginal effects show age and other income 
sources of farmers as the statistically significant factors that influence cocoa farmers’ 
willingness to adopt crop insurance. 
From Table 5, columns 3 and 4 show age to be statistically significant at 5%. This 
negatively affected the willingness of cocoa farmers to use crop insurance. Based on the 
marginal effect of age, it means that since age is a continuous variable, for each 
additional age, cocoa farmers are 0.17% less likely to adopt crop insurance. The finding 
is consistent with the prior expectation that older farmers tend to be less likely to use crop 
insurance. The results from Table 5 indicated that as farmers grow older, their level of 
participation in using crop insurance decreases. The finding is akin to existing findings by 
Baidu-Forson (1999) and Aidoo et al. (2014) who found that older farmers tend to use 
their experience and highly committed to primitive strategies to farming. Older farmers 
are less likely to accept innovative technology in farming (Baido-Forson, 1999; Aidoo et 
al., 2014). Mulugetta (2005) maintained that all things being equal, older farmers lack 
interest in innovative technology. Older farmers have a lot of experience in managing 
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production risks in cocoa production than younger farmers, which makes older farmers 
less likely to use crop insurance due to their risk-loving aptitude ( Baidu-Forson, 1999). 
Farmers’ income from other sources was statistically significant at 5%, and 
negatively influenced cocoa farmer’s willingness to adopt crop insurance. The marginal 
effect from Table 5 indicates that for each additional other income earned by a cocoa 
farmer, cocoa farmers are 0.01% less likely to adopt crop insurance. This means that as 
farmers receive additional income to complement the income earned from cocoa, they 
tend to feel protected against production losses. The reason could be that they have a 
diversified portfolio of income sources.  
Similarly, the study hypothesized income from cocoa to influence farmers’ 
willingness to use crop insurance but the results were different. The result could mean 
that as farmers earn higher incomes from cocoa production, they may consider using 
other risk management strategies even at a high cost than those who earn lower incomes. 
The negative influence or significance may explain this reasoning.  
The level of education positively influenced the willingness to use crop insurance 
but was not statistically significant. This finding is not consistent with the prior 
expectation that farmers with a level of education are more likely to adopt crop insurance. 
The finding is inconsistent with the finding of Annan (2015) that cocoa farmers with 
formal education are more likely to adopt crop insurance. A possible reason could be that 
farmers with formal education tend to apply the necessary production procedures to avoid 
the risk of losing crops.  
One would expect married farmers to adopt crop insurance to protect their 
families when there is production loss. However, marital status inconsistent with prior 
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expectations. It was insignificant but positively influenced willingness to use crop 
insurance. The possibility could be that the number of labor increases when a farmer 
marries and procreates. This increases the productivity on the farm to be able to face the 
challenges of production risks. This finding is uneven with the finding of Danso-Abbeam 
et al., (2014) that married farmers are more likely to adopt crop insurance to be able to 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper evaluated the factors that influence the willingness of cocoa farmers to 
adopt crop insurance in the Upper West Akim District of the Eastern Region of Ghana. 
The objective of the study was to look at how cocoa farmers could hedge against 
production risks. It can be inferred from the paper that the majority (83.9%) of the 
respondents are aware of insurance in general. Although majority of the farmers have 
knowledge about insurance in general, only 38.9% were aware of crop insurance. 
Majority (61.1%) of the farmers had no prior knowledge that crop insurance can help 
them hedge against production risks. The no-adoption of crop insurance is as a result of a 
lack of provision for a crop insurance scheme. This clearly reveals that cocoa farmers are 
not familiar with crop insurance schemes that will help them mitigate and manage 
production risks.  
            A whopping 94% of the farmers are keen on using crop insurance. On average, 
farmers are willing to pay an amount of GHS44.29  as crop insurance premium. It was 
found that although farmers are willing to use crop insurance,  many of them cannot 
afford to pay higher premiums as the highest premium they were willing  to pay was 
GHS150.00. 
The major production risks that affects cocoa farmers are pest and disease 
(95.6%), drought (88.5%), variations in yield (87.6%), poor access to inputs (66.4%), 
high temperatures (69%) and high input prices (66.4%). 
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            The probit and logistic regressions showed age and other income sources of 
farmers as the statistically significant factors influencing farmer’s willingness to use crop 
insurance or not.  
           Based on the findings from the study, it is recommended that the younger people 
should be motivated to get involved in cocoa farming. This is because, on average, 
majority of the farmers were aged. The youth engaging in cocoa farming would help 
increase Ghana’s cocoa yield. The government, COCOBOD and private stakeholders 
should actively sensitize and educate cocoa farmers on the benefits of adopting crop 
insurance. It is also recommended that the government, COCOBOD and other private 
firms should make farm inputs accessible and cheap to smallholder cocoa farmers in 
Ghana. This could help farmers avoid huge production lossess due to pest and disease 
attack.  
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Probit regression reporting marginal effects  
 
Variable                      AME       SE             z            p          lower     upper 
 
 
Educationallevel       0.0317    0.0543     0.5842   0.5591  -0.0746   0.1380 
Householdsize          0.0022    0.0061     0.3610   0.7181  -0.0098   0.0142 
Gender                     0.0072     0.0625     0.1156   0.9080  -0.1154   0.1298 
Age                         -0.0027     0.0017    -1.6171   0.1059  -0.0060   0.0006 
Income                     0.0000     0.0000     0.5502   0.5822  -0.0000   0.0000 
Otherincome           -0.0001     0.0001    -1.9241  0.0543  -0.0002   0.0000 
Maritalstatus            0.0306     0.0579     0.5283   0.5973  -0.0829   0.1440 
Table 6 
Logit regression reporting marginal effects  
Variable                        AME        SE            z           p          lower     upper 
 
 EducationalLevel      0.0317     0.0543   0.5842   0.5591    -0.0746   0.1380 
 Householdsize           0.0022     0.0061   0.3610   0.7181   -0.0098   0.0142 
Gender                        0.0072     0.0625   0.1156   0.9080   -0.1154   0.1298 
 Age                           -0.0027     0.0017  -1.6171   0.1059   -0.0060   0.0006 
Income                        0.0000     0.0000   0.5502   0.5822   -0.0000   0.0000 
 
Otherincome              -0.0001     0.0001  -1.9241   0.0543  -0.0002   0.0000 
Maritalstatus               0.0306     0.0579   0.5283   0.5973   -0.0829   0.1440 
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Source: Data from field survey(2020) 
 
 
Figure 4.  
Cocoa farmers’ access to cocoa extension services  
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